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The Racial Politics of Due Process 
Protection: Does Partisanship 
or Racial Composition Influence 
State-Level Adoption of 
Recorded Interrogation Policies?
Jason T. Carmichael and Stephanie L. Kent
Abstract
Discoveries of wrongful convictions have increased substantially over the last several decades. 
During this period, practitioners and scholars have been advocating for the adoption of policies 
aimed at reducing the likelihood of convicting a person for a crime they did not commit. Imple­
menting such policies are vitally important not only because they help ensure that the innocent do 
not receive unwarranted sanctions or that the guilty go unpunished but also because cases of 
wrongful conviction can erode public confidence in the criminal justice system and trust in the rule of 
law. To avoid such outcomes, many states have adopted policies through legislation that aim to 
reduce system errors. It remains unclear, however, why some states appear more willing to provide 
due process protections against wrongful convictions than others. Findings suggest that dimensions 
of racial politics may help explain the reluctance of some states to adopt protections against 
wrongful convictions. Specifically, interaction terms show that states with a Republican governor and 
a large African American population are the least likely to adopt policies aimed at protecting against 
wrongful convictions. We thus identify important differences in the political and social context 
between U.S. states that influence the adoption of criminal justice policies.
A wide-body of literature has pointed to the prevalence of false confessions during police inter­
rogations and the resulting wrongful convictions (e.g., Dixon, 2006; Feld, 2014; J. Gould & Leo, 
2010; Huff, 2002; Kent & Carmichael, 2015; Leo, 2008; Leo & Richmond, 2007; Sullivan, 2005; 
Thompson, 2012; Trainum, 2016). These scholars advance very compelling arguments in favor of
mandatory recording of police interrogations to reduce the likelihood of false confessions. Despite 
calls for legislative change in this area, data from the Innocence Project show that the vast majority 
of U.S. states have failed to adopt policies mandating police to record interrogations of suspects. To 
date, scholarship has failed to account for the reluctance on the part of most state-level policy makers 
to implement such policies. The primary aim in this study is to better understand why some states 
appear to be resisting a mandate for police to record custodial interrogations of criminal suspects. 
This is particularly troubling given that Garrett (2011) and the Innocence Project estimate that 15- 
20% of wrongful convictions between 1989 and 2007 were caused by false confessions coerced by 
police during custodial interrogations (innocenceproject.org). These false confessions, which are 
typically gained through intense psychological pressure and other coercive tactics employed by the 
police, could be prevented by simply requiring the recording of interrogations (Leo & Richmond, 
2007; Trainum, 2016). Yet less than one in three U.S. states have instituted laws that mandate the 
electronic recording of custodial interrogations (Innocence Project, n.d.). That so few states require 
mandatory recording remains baffling, particularly given the relatively low cost (as compared to 
other policies such as DNA preservation) associated with instituting such a policy.
Brief Overview of Recorded Interrogation Literature
Scholarship has outlined both the benefits and costs associated with required recording of custodial 
interrogations. Sullivan (2005), for instance, provides a thorough explanation of the benefits. First, 
recordings expose and thus aim to prevent police misconduct, which protects suspects, but also 
officers, from unjustified charges of abuse. Second, recordings provide juries with clear evidence 
from confessions and inconsistencies in statements thereby alleviating the problem of conflicting 
testimony from suspects and law enforcement. Third, officers are able to focus on nonverbal cues 
from suspects because they do not have to record details of the interrogation on paper. Fourth, 
recordings can serve as training materials to police recruits who are learning interrogation tech­
niques. Finally, recording interrogations suggest to the public that the criminal justice system is 
dedicated to protecting a suspect’s due process rights.
The disadvantages outlined by Sullivan (2005) are fewer, and the main resistance to these laws 
comes from law enforcement agencies. One potential concern with recording is that suspects may be 
less likely to confess or witnesses less likely to be forthcoming when they know they are being 
recorded. Second, law enforcement agencies may be skeptical of proposals from academics or 
defense attorneys whom they perceive as unsupportive of or unfamiliar with police work. Finally, 
police agencies claim that recording is either too expensive or not feasible (Kassin, Leo, Meissner, & 
Richman, 2007). But these arguments are not supported by empirical research (Leo & Richmond, 
2007). Leo and Richmond (2007) claim that the initial costs of maintaining electronic recording will 
pay off in the long run because multiple interrogators need not be present to take notes (as is 
frequently required when interrogations are not recorded), and officers themselves will spend less 
time writing statements. And there are additional cost savings. There are fewer trials when police 
have recorded evidence (Sullivan, 2006). There may be fewer expensive litigation claims related to 
police misconduct when recordings provide clear evidence of interrogation tactics (Leo, 1996) and 
fewer cases of wrongful conviction that must be later ameliorated.1 Furthermore, multiple studies 
show that recording interrogations does not decrease the “hit rate” of confessions or incriminating 
statements made by suspects (Leo & Richmond, 2007; Sullivan, 2005) perhaps because many states 
can legally record interrogations without notifying suspects (L. Oliver, 2005). Even when suspects 
are notified, Slobogin (2003) reports that they are not deterred from speaking candidly. Finally, 
evidence from the police themselves runs counter to the argument that they are disadvantaged in 
some way by recording. Buckley and Jayne’s (2005) survey of police in Alaska and Minnesota found 
that officers believed that recording was more beneficial to prosecutors than defense attorneys.
Other nationwide surveys of law enforcement reveal that once police are required to record inter­
rogations and the practice becomes entrenched in their routine of processing criminal suspects and 
witnesses, police report that they find this requirement useful and efficient (Sullivan, 2005). It seems 
unlikely then that requiring recording would place undue burdens on law enforcement.
Historically, problems have arisen when interrogations are not recorded (for reasons noted 
above), and some states have recognized the importance of mandating recording. Illinois was the 
first to require recording statewide through changes to the state revised code. In other states, like 
Alaska and Minnesota, the state Supreme Court implemented the requirement. But legal experts 
argue that mandates to record interrogations are ideally adopted through legislative change at the 
state level because they are better able to dictate exactly when and where recordings will take place, 
what constitutes exceptions to the law, the procedures regarding equipment and storage of evidence, 
and the consequences of failures to record (Sullivan, 2005).
Having a recording of all interrogations, post Miranda rights, would leave little question about the 
validity and reliability of statements made by both police and suspects. Furthermore, scholarship has 
shown that the leading factor associated with wrongful convictions is eyewitness misidentification 
(Collins & Jarvis, 2009; Trainum, 2016). Studies have shown that between 77% and 84% of 
wrongful convictions are due to eyewitness error (Garrett, 2011; Huff, Rattner, & Sagarin, 1996; 
Scheck, Neufeld, & Dwyer, 2000). This type of error is more likely when police officers threaten or 
badger witnesses during interrogations. False confessions have also led to a number of wrongful 
convictions. Scheck, Neufeld, and Dwyer (2000)’s data on exonerated individuals suggest that false 
or coerced confessions were the primary grounds for conviction in about 25% of the first 62 
postconviction DNA exonerations, and Garrett (2011) finds that 16% of the first 250 exonerees 
confessed to crimes they did not commit, corroborating its role as one of the most common causes of 
wrongful convictions (Feld, 2014; Kassin et al., 2010; Trainum, 2016), but one that scholars claim 
could be reduced with only minor modifications to state statutes.
Despite these serious concerns, many states appear reluctant to adopt legislation that mandates 
the recording of custodial interrogations. That said, little is known about why some states institute 
these laws and others do not because no empirical analyses of state differences in electronic 
recording exist. Theory borrowed from political sociology may offer some insight. The political 
preferences of the electorate, legislators, and state executives might impact the likelihood of 
legislative adoption, but the social characteristics of states may also matter. The present study 
examines whether sociopolitical conditions within states can help determine why some have 
passed legislation aimed at protecting the due process rights of those accused of committing 
crimes and others have not.
Theoretical Framework
Political Explanations
Based on the assumption that decisions about laws and punishments are intrinsically political 
(Chambliss, 1999; Garland, 2005; Kent & Carmichael, 2014; Yates & Fording, 2005), criminolo­
gists have increasingly borrowed from political sociology to help explain the variation in punitive 
crime control policies. A large body of scholarship now exists to support the idea that the criminal 
law and the broader criminal justice system are at least partly shaped by the structural context, 
particularly the political ideology of politicians and the citizenry. Garland (2001), for instance, notes 
that conservatives generally believe that crime is an individual decision stemming from immorality 
while liberals are more likely to see the social environment as the root cause of crime. Stemming 
from this view, Republican Party voters tend to favor harsher punishments and heightened social 
control of street crime and Republican politicians have regularly used law and order issues to gain
votes from less prosperous, nonminority citizens who resent the underclass and who are more likely 
to live where violent crime risks are greater (Edsall & Edsall, 1991; Garland, 2001; Kent & 
Carmichael, 2014; W. M. Oliver, 2003, p. 126). Beckett (1997) shows that both conservative voters 
and politicians are concerned that criminal courts are too lenient. Given this, one would expect 
conservatives to be less likely to support policies such as those mandating the recording of custodial 
interrogations because they provide protections for criminal suspects. Scholars have described two 
mechanisms that allow political ideologies to translate into legislative change related to the criminal 
justice system. First, in a democratic system, public preferences should affect laws and criminal 
justice policy. Second, the ideologies and preferences of those who control the legislative and 
executive branches of state government may also contribute to the adoption of due process legis­
lation. Both of these processes are outlined and tested below.
Republican Politicians
One way to test the above assumptions is to examine the political composition of the legislative and 
executive branches. The state executive is responsible for final decisions about changes to law and 
procedure because she or he has the power to veto legislation and use executive orders to change 
decisions made by the courts. It is not surprising then that many studies find that the presence of 
Republican executives predicts a variety of criminal justice outcomes. Studies report that greater 
Republican political strength is associated with more severe punishments including increased impri­
sonments at the state or national level (D. Jacobs & Carmichael, 2001; D. Jacobs & Helms, 1996; D. 
Jacobs, Malone, & lies, 2012), a state’s likelihood of having the death penalty as a possible sanction 
(D. Jacobs & Carmichael, 2002), and the number of executions in the United States (D. Jacobs, Qian, 
Carmichael, & Kent, 2007).
Davies, Blaize, and Pollitz-Worden (2009) note that the majority of studies that examine the role 
of politics on the criminal justice system focus on punitive outcomes such as those noted above. 
Scholars have paid less attention to how political factors may influence policies and programs that 
protect due process rights for those suspected of committing crimes. Those that have done so find a 
relationship between political leanings of jurisdictions and a state’s willingness to adopt additional 
due process protections. Kent and Carmichael (2014) found that states dominated by Republicans 
are significantly less likely to adopt a set of policies aimed at reducing wrongful convictions. Owens 
and Griffiths (2012), however, found that the political ideology of a state did not predict whether 
states had laws that provide for compensation to those wrongfully convicted of a crime.
The makeup of the legislative branch is also likely to influence the adoption of policies that 
protect due process rights because they dictate criminal justice policy. Specifically, a Republican- 
controlled state legislature that favors strengthening the criminal justice system will likely be less 
supportive of laws that are perceived to restrict the ability of the police to interrogate suspects. Prior 
research generally supports the notion that Republican legislatures advocate for stronger social 
control of street crime and more punitive laws. For example, the proportion of the state’s budget 
spent on corrections increases with more Republicans in the state legislature (Stucky, Heimer, & 
Lang, 2007). Similarly, D. Jacobs, Malone, and lies (2012) found that increases in prison admissions 
were partly explained by Republican control of state legislatures. Again, only a few studies looked at 
the effect of Republican legislatures on laws and policies that favor due process. Kent and Carmi­
chael (2015) report that states with Republican-controlled legislatures have more laws that protect 
criminal suspects from wrongful convictions, and Davies et al. (2009) find that Republican control 
of the statehouse leads to less state-level support for indigent defense. The goal here is to assess 
whether a similar mechanism could help explain the adoption of laws that require police to record 
custodial interrogations.
Public Partisanship and Legislative Access
In their analysis, Zalman, Larson, and Smith (2012) demonstrate that liberals are more concerned 
about the possibility of convicting innocent people so laws that mandate the recording of custodial 
interrogations may be more common in states with more Democrats. Republicans, on the other hand, 
tend to be more concerned about increasing police powers and making the overall criminal justice 
system more punitive. Prior studies have offered mixed support for these claims. Weidner and Frase 
(2003), for instance, found that states where more voters supported a Republican presidential 
candidate had higher rates of incarceration and others found higher incarceration rates of African 
Americans in particular (D. Jacobs & Carmichael, 2002; Keen & Jacobs, 2009), but other studies 
find no effect of votes for Republican presidential candidates on incarceration and sentencing 
decisions (Wang & Mears, 2015).
While these studies contribute to knowledge about how citizen ideology creates variations in 
criminal justice outcomes, they fail to consider potential interactive effects between citizen ideology 
and other potentially important factors. In particular, a number of states allow members of the public 
to place issues on the ballot. Scholars have argued that when citizens are authorized to place issues 
on the ballot, governments in those jurisdictions become more responsive to public demands than 
would be the case under a less direct form of democracy (see Lascher, Hagen, & Rochlin, 1996; 
Lupia & Matsusaka, 2004). Under such a scheme, it seems plausible that policy makers in these 
jurisdictions would be more likely to adopt policies that are consistent with public opinion to avoid 
public-driven initiatives that can leave lawmakers with little flexibility if they pass. The regression 
models presented below will assess this possibility.
Racial Threat
As noted in the introduction, recording police interrogations confers several important benefits, 
including the potential to reduce public distrust in how police interrogate suspects, which may 
improve police-community relations. Scholars also claim that recorded interrogations are especially 
useful in preventing wrongful convictions of racial minorities because citizens of color account for 
more than 70% of those who have been wrongfully convicted and later exonerated (Innocence 
Project, n.d.).
Criminologists have long reported that social control varies with the proportion of the population 
that belongs to a racial or ethnic minority group (cf. Behrens, Uggen, & Manza, 2003; Liska, 1992). 
The racial threat perspective specifies that a large minority population threatens the interests of the 
majority group, who then respond politically by demanding, among other things, increased social 
control (Blalock, 1967). This aligns with empirical research which finds that those of European 
descent are more fearful of crime and hold more negative stereotypes about racial minorities in 
places with large minority populations (L. Bobo & Hutchings, 1996; Chiricos, McEntire, & Gertz, 
2001; Golden, 2012; Pickett, Chiricos, Golden, & Gertz, 2012; Quillian & Pager, 2010). The 
perceived threat posed by minority populations’ results in support for coercive social control efforts 
that largely target street crimes committed by minority groups (Carmichael & Kent, 2014; Ruddell, 
2005). For example, support for capital punishment is higher in places with large African American 
populations (Baumer, Messner, & Rosenfeld, 2003), cities with more African Americans have more 
police (Carmichael & Kent, 2014; Holmes, Smith, Freng, & Munoz, 2008; McCarty, Ren, & Zhao, 
2012) and more incidents of police use of lethal force (Willits & Nowacki, 2014), states with more 
racial minorities spend more on corrections (Stucky et al., 2007) and incarcerate more people 
(D. Jacobs & Carmichael, 2001; D. Jacobs et al., 2012), and counties with more African Americans 
have higher jail populations (Carmichael, 2005). Larger percentages of African American residents 
have been associated with higher execution probabilities (D. Jacobs et al., 2007), more severe
sanctioning of juvenile offenders (Carmichael, 2011; Carmichael & Burgos, 2012), and legislation 
allowing the use of the death penalty in U.S. states (D. Jacobs & Carmichael, 2002).
While the majority of research focuses on threat produced by African Americans, some of the 
above studies found a similar effect associated with a large Latino American population. African 
American communities have a long history of contentious relationships with law enforcement but 
some scholars claim that Latino American communities also have problematic relationships with 
local police (Huang & Vaughn, 1996; Walker, 1997) particularly given the increase in local police 
participation in the enforcement of immigration law (Decker, Lewis, Provine, & Varsanyi, 2009). 
The most recent test of this ethnic variant of the theory on police behavior found that, controlling for 
the amount of crime, cities with high proportions of Latino American residents had more police 
(Kent & Carmichael, 2014) perhaps because police administrators and the public respond to a 
perceived criminal threat posed by Latino American by strengthening the police force. If Latino 
American threat influences the adoption of due process protections such as requiring all interroga­
tions to be recorded, then jurisdictions with a large Latino community will be less likely to require 
police to record interrogations.
Recent studies show that not only is there more social control in terms of harsher punishments in 
places with many minorities, but there are also more laws that disadvantage criminal suspects, 
suggesting that due process is less of a concern in places characterized by racial threat. Manza and 
Uggen (2006) found that states with high African American populations were the most likely to have 
enacted felony disenfranchisement laws that restrict convicted felons from voting. Whittle and 
Parker (2014) found that states with large minority populations had more stigmatizing collateral 
sanctions against convicted felons. Davies et al. (2009) report less state support for indigent defense 
in states with high levels of racial threat. These studies indicate that laws and policies that dis­
advantage street criminals and instead favor a crime control model of criminal justice are at least 
partly produced by responses to racial threat.
But more recent studies argue that simply examining the size of a racial or ethnic minority 
population as an indicator of threat is too simplistic. Increasingly, researchers have refined the 
minority threat explanation by looking at how the threat produced by a sizable African American 
population is conditional on other macro level social factors, namely, political factors. For example, 
Stucky (2012) reports that arrest rates of African Americans are higher in cities where this group 
accounts for a greater share of the overall city population, but when the city also has an African 
Americans mayor, arrest rates of African Americans decline. Carmichael and Burgos (2012) also 
show that life sentences are more frequent in jurisdictions with more African Americans but the size 
of the effect is larger in jurisdictions where judges are elected to their office (as opposed to 
appointed). Findings like these suggest that public policies are not just products of a majority’s 
response to the threat posed by minorities but are also influenced by local politics; however, most 
empirical studies analyze political ideologies and racial composition as separate factors and fail to 
consider interactions between politics and race. The present study fills this gap in the existing 
literature by considering the possibility of a joint effect.
Fluctuations in crime rates may also influence criminal justice policy. Through the media, the 
public is regularly informed about the extent of crime (especially violent crime) in their commu­
nities. This heightened awareness likely creates fear of victimization among the public that, in turn, 
may spark demands for harsher punishment and possibly less concern for due process rights afforded 
to criminal suspects. Some empirical evidence supports such a claim. For instance, D. Jacobs, Qian, 
Carmichael, and Kent (2007) reported that the probability of execution is greater in states with the 
highest murder rates. This hypothesis is tested to see if similar mechanisms operate when states 
consider mandating that police record interrogations. Finally, it seems likely that states with a record 
of convicting innocent people would be more inclined to adopt policies to avoid such errors. To 
account for this possibility, the models control for the number of exonerations in each state.
Current Study
Drawing on the literature reviewed above, the possibility that sociopolitical conditions within each 
state influence state adoption of policies aimed at reducing wrongful convictions is consider. 
Specifically, the analyses assess factors associated with the adoption of legislations that require the 
recording of police interrogations of suspects. The present study focuses on political explanations. 
As outlined in the previous section, both theory and research have demonstrated that political 
conservatives are less likely to support policies they believe would weaken law enforcement. Given 
this, the following set of hypotheses related to the political structure will assessed:
Hypothesis 1: States with Republican governors will be less likely to have mandatory recording 
statutes
Hypothesis 2: States with Republican-controlled legislatures will be less likely to support 
policies that would strengthen due process rights while potentially limiting the ability of police 
to garner confessions from criminal suspects.
Hypothesis 3: States with a more conservative public will be less likely to support the 
adoption of statutes that require law enforcement to record the interrogation of suspects. 
Hypothesis 4: States that allow citizens to place issues on the ballot, particularly those in more 
conservative states, will be less likely to adopt policies requiring recorded interrogations 
because politicians in these jurisdictions will be more responsive to the policy preferences 
of their constituents.
Hypotheses are also derived from theory and research on racial threat. Racial threat theory 
suggests that stronger social control efforts are likely in places with many racial minorities. If this 
is true, the following hypothesis are expected:
Hypothesis 5: States with large racial minority populations will be less likely to restrict law 
enforcement powers, including their ability to obtain confessions during interrogations which 
might be constrained when recording is required.
Because the political factors that shape punitive criminal justice outcomes are largely racialized 
by Republican politicians in order to gain electoral support (Alexander, 2010; Beckett & Sasson, 
2004) and because large minority populations may represent a strong political force in their own 
right which may allow them to influence policy outcomes (Jackson, 1989), there may be less support 
for laws that aim to protect criminal suspects in states with high racial threat and a Republican state 
executive. Hence, it is expected that:
Hypothesis 6: States with many racial minorities and a Republican governor will be less 
likely to have a law requiring the recording of custodial interrogations.
Two additional hypotheses are related to the control factors introduced. They are:
Hypothesis 7: States with higher crime rate will be less inclined to increase the due process 
rights of suspects by mandating that police officers record interrogations.
Hypothesis 8: States with a history of wrongful convictions will be more likely to adopt 
measures to protect against such errors.
Data, Measures, and Estimation
The hypotheses outlined above are assessed using a data set containing social and political vari­
ables for all 50 states. Annual data are gathered for each independent variable between 2000 and 
2010. The one exception was the percentage minority which was interpolated using census data in 
2000 and 2010. The start of the series is ideal because very few (two) states had adopted legislation 
that required police to record interrogations prior to the year 2000. The analyses also predict the 
adoption of such policies through 2011. While more states may adopt such policies in the future, 
those states that wanted to adopt such policies have had ample opportunity to do so. At a mini­
mum, further delay by state legislators in nonadopting states indicates a strong aversion to pursue 
such a policy. The goal here is to ascertain what social and political conditions in a state might 
explain why some states adopt due process protections aimed at reducing wrongful convictions 
and why other appear to reject such policies.
The Dependent Variables (DVs)
Data for the DV were taken from the Innocence Project website (www.innocenceproject.org). The 
Innocence Project is an advocacy organization founded in 1992 by prominent defense lawyers Barry 
Scheck and Peter Neufeld. Their mission is to investigate potential cases of wrongful convictions 
and, once identified, to provide legal representation required to prove the innocence of prisoners. To 
date, exonerations have primarily been achieved through the testing of DNA evidence. Beyond 
working to exonerate prisoners who have been wrongfully convicted, the project advances a state- 
by-state campaign to have policy makers adopt policies that reduce the likelihood that such errors 
happen in the first place. As part of their efforts, the Innocence Project’s advocacy work has 
involved the development of model legislation for state legislators to consider if they wish to reduce 
the likelihood of wrongful convictions. Recommendations include instituting laws to allow inmates’ 
access to postconviction DNA testing, laws that require the preservation of DNA evidence, reform to 
eyewitness procedures, crime lab oversight, regulations related to the use of informants, financial 
compensation for those individuals wrongfully convicted of a crime, and, importantly, protections 
against false confessions. Policies aimed at protecting suspects against false confessions have largely 
included demands for legislation that requires police to record interrogations because evidence sug­
gests that coerced, false confessions are responsible for a substantial share of all wrongful confessions 
(J. Gould & Leo, 2010; Trainum, 2016). The primary focus here is on the adoption of recorded 
interrogation legislation in this particular study because, unlike other policy recommendations, record­
ing interrogations are very inexpensive to implement relative to more costly alternatives such as DNA 
preservation. Thus, while a state’s legislative body may be reluctant to adopt some of the policies 
advanced by the Innocence Project because they may require substantial resources to implement, it is 
unlikely that a state’s aversion to adopting recorded interrogations can be attributed to resource 
constraints, so one must look for alternative explanations to account for such reluctance.
Over the last decade, a number of state legislatures have passed legislation requiring police 
officers to systematically record all interrogations in an effort to reduce system errors. As stated 
above, the goal is to assess the explanatory power of a series of theoretically derived models that 
may better explain why some states have made these statutory changes and others are reluctant to do 
so. To this end, the DV is a dummy variable coded “1” in those years when a state had legislation 
requiring recorded interrogations, otherwise “0.” The list of states with legislation requiring 
recorded interrogations and the political context in those states are listed in “Note” section.2 The 
study focuses on the state rather than alternative levels of aggregation because it is primarily 
concerned with testing political accounts that may be associated with the adoption of recorded 
interrogation policies and because relevant statutes can only be adopted at the state level.
The Explanatory Variables
Data for the explanatory variables were taken from the U.S. Census, the Innocence Project website, 
or the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Uniform Crime Reports. A number of individual 
variables to account for political differences between states are included. These include Republican 
control of the state’s legislative or executive branches as well as a proxy measure of citizen 
ideological preferences. The strength of the Republican Party in each state is operationalized using 
two separate variables. The first is a dummy variable coded “ 1 ” if Republicans control the state 
legislature using a 55% threshold. The second factor is a dummy variable coded “ 1 ” if the state has a 
Republican governor. A proxy for citizen ideology based on voting in presidential elections is also 
introduced. Drawing on the scholarly understanding of political ideology, a proxy is used as an 
indicator of public resistance or support for wrongful conviction legislation. This proxy is a dummy 
variable coded “1” if the majority (over 50%) of the citizens in each state voted for the Republican 
candidate for president in presidential elections since 2000. While imperfect, the proxy can capture 
the extent to which citizens in a state are in favor of adopting policies that can protect against 
wrongful convictions. Data for all of the political variables were taken from the U.S. Census.
The final politically derived variable is a measure of the degree to which citizens in a state can directly 
advance legislative change through ballot initiatives. Both a direct effect of allowing citizen ballot 
initiatives on adoption of due process legislation as well as an interactive model that assesses if state 
legislatures with a more conservative public and the right to seek ballot initiatives are more responsive to 
citizen preferences are considered. To capture this possibility, a dummy variable is constructed and coded 
“ 1 ” if a state allows citizen ballot initiatives, “0” otherwise. The list of states that provide a ballot initiative 
option is collected by the National Conference of State Legislatures (www.ncsl.org/research.aspx).
Beyond the political factors mentioned above, the models also account for additional theoreti­
cally derived measures that may contribute to the adoption of wrongful conviction legislation in a 
given state. Specifically, variations in criminal activity are accounted for by including the violent 
crime rate (murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault) in each state taken from the FBI’s Uni­
form Crime Reports. The extent that states have experience with cases of wrongful convictions is 
accounted for by including the number of exonerations in each state. Exoneration data are taken 
from the Innocence Project webpage. Finally, the influence of minority presence on the adoption of 
wrongful conviction legislation is assessed using the combined percentage of both the African 
American and Latino American populations.
Estimation
To predict state-level adoption of legislation requiring police to record the interrogation of suspects, a 
pooled time-series logistic regression technique is employed. Logistic regression is the appropriate 
technique because it produces the most reliable estimates when the DV is dichotomous as it is here 
(see Long & Freese, 2006, for a detailed discussion of regression with categorical variables). It is worth 
noting that each model builds in an implicit causal order by using explanatory variables lagged 1 year 
behind the outcome (e.g., values for the explanatory variables in 2000 are used to predict the outcomes 
in 2001). Finally, the variance inflation factor (VIF) was well below 2.0, suggesting that multicolli- 
nearity is not degrading the results (the highest VIF score is 1.58 for percentage of African American).
Results
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 presents the means, standard deviations, and the range for each of the variables. The table 
illustrates how varied states are in their willingness to adopt legislation aimed at reducing or
eliminating wrongful convictions. The data show that in 2001, only 2 states (4%) had adopted 
legislation to require police to record interrogations of suspects and that by 2011, 15 states required 
this practice (list of states can be found in Note 2). Additionally, roughly one third of state legis­
latures were controlled by Republicans and about half of governors were Republicans. Finally, 
citizen initiated ballot initiatives were possible in roughly half of U.S. states. The goal here is to 
assess whether or not these sociopolitical conditions influence adoption of an inexpensive policy 
aimed at reducing the likelihood of wrongful convictions.
Table 2 presents the bivariate correlation matrix. The table shows that the correlations are in the 
direction predicted by the hypotheses presented above. It is noteworthy that the two strongest 
negative bivariate relationships are political indicators. The presence of a Republican governor and 
the percentage of the state population voting for a Republican president are the two strongest 
negative correlates with the outcome (Hypotheses 3 and 1, respectively). The next strongest negative 
bivariate relationship exists between minority presence and the outcome variable (Hypothesis 5). 
The multivariate analyses that follow will help determine whether these factors are statistically 
significant when considered together.














1 = Mandatory recording of police Dependent 0.04 0.31 0.39 0 1
interrogations variable
Violent crime rate — 420.34 366.45 170.32 78.20 822.70
Percentage of minority — 17.94 21.75 12.66 1.30 50
1 = Republicans control of state — 0.36 0.32 0.49 0 1
legislature
1 = Republican governor — 0.58 0.46 0.50
0
1
Percentage of Republican presidential — 50.43 47.84 9.06 26.4 71.5
vote
1 = Public initiated ballots allowed Joint 0.48 0.48 0.50 0 1
No. of exonerations in state + 0.38 0.36 0.85 0 6
Note. N = 551 state years.
Table 2. Correlation Matrix.
Variable Name 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Record interrogations
2. Violent crime rate
1
-.05 1
3. Percentage of minority -.09 .67 1
4. Republicans control of state legislature -.06 -.10 -.16 1
5. Republican governor -.16 .01 .01 .22 1
6. Percentage of Republican presidential vote -.14 -.03 .01 .52 .12 1
7. Public initiated ballots allowed -.06 -.04 -.28 .23 .12 .23 1
8. No. of exonerations -.02 .17 .19 .06 .09 -.04 -.05 1
Multivariate Analyses
Table 3 presents results from the multivariate analyses predicting the probability of state adoption of 
legislation that requires police to record custodial interrogations. Model 1 is a limited specification
that includes the racial composition variable, violent crime, and measures of the political climate. 
This early model shows that, consistent with the Hypothesis 7, states with higher violent crime rates 
are significantly less likely to adopt legislation that requires recorded interrogations. Hypothesis 6 
predicted a negative relationship between minority threat and the outcome; however, it appears that 
states with larger minority populations are significantly more inclined to require recorded interroga­
tions. It seems plausible that politicians in states with a large minority population have become 
responsive to minority group preferences by adopting policies that strengthen due process protec­
tions. This is particularly likely given that minorities are more inclined to think police are discri­
minatory toward members of their community (Pew Research Center, 2014).
Model 1 also includes four separate indicators of the political climate within each state (to test 
Hypotheses 1-4). The first two identify Republican control of state government. It appears that 
states with a Republican governor are significantly less likely to adopt legislation that requires police 
to record the interrogation of suspects. That said, Republican control of the state legislature does not 
influence the implementation of such a policy. Why are there such divergent findings associated 
with Republican control of government? It seems plausible that due process policy adoption such as 
the mandatory recording of interrogations is at least partly a result of motivation by the governor. 
This is consistent with a rather large body of research which suggests that public opinion on 
important issues as well as legislative change are shaped by cues from political elites, with the state 
governor being perhaps the most influential (cf. Darmofal, 2005; Tolbert, Smit, & Green, 2009).
Finally, Model 1 includes tests of citizen political preferences and the presence of democratic 
policies that allow the public to advance their preferences through ballot initiatives. As hypothe­
sized, states with a more conservative public (i.e., voting for a Republican presidential candidate) 
were significantly less likely to have adopted legislation mandating police officers to record inter­
rogation of suspects. Finally, despite expectations to the contrary, states that allow the public to 
place initiatives on the ballot are not significantly more likely to adopt such policies. Later models 
assess the possibility of the joint relationship hypothesized.
Table 3. Pooled Time-Series Logistic Regression Estimates Predicting the U.S. States With a Statutory 
Requirement That Police Record Interrogations, 2000-2010.
Variable Name Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Threat and control variables
Violent crime rate -0.028*** (0.007) -0.032*** (0.007) -0.031*** (0.007)
No. of exonerations in state 0.031 (0.396) 0.062 (0.458) -0.099 (0.413)
Percentage of minority 0.328** (0.1 18) 0.567*** (0.1 10) 0.373*** (0.104)
Political variables
1 = Republicans control of state legislature -0.226 (1.07) -0.102 (1.091) -0.402 (1.076)
1 = Republican governor -2.371** (0.804) 0.992 (1.483) -2.175** (0.825)
Percentage of Republican presidential vote -0.432*** (0.095) -0.474*** (0.099) -0.353** (0.1 19)
1 = Public initiated ballots allowed 2.209 (2.620) 3.980 (2.567) 15.782 (11.167)
Interaction terms
Percentage of Minority x Republican — -0.251** (0.085) —
Governor
Public Initiated Ballots x Percentage of — — —0.292+ (0.189)
Republican Vote
Constant 13.597 11.809 9.380
N (state years) 551 551 551
Wald x2 45.640*** 76.17*** 84.26***
Note. Coefficients above with standard errors are in parentheses. 
+p < . I. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
In order to test Hypothesis 6, Models 2 and 3 add an interaction term to the variables considered 
in Model 1. The results from Model 2 suggest that racial politics is playing a rather strong role in the 
adoption of due process protection policies. While Model 1 clearly shows that states with a large 
minority population were more likely to mandate that police record interrogations, this relationship 
is reversed in states with a Republican governor. In other words, when there is a Republican 
governor in a state with a large minority population, there is a significantly lower likelihood that 
the state requires police to record interrogations. This suggests that partisan preferences for certain 
criminal justice policies operate together with racial prejudices and fears to significantly (above and 
beyond any individual, direct effect these indicators have) decrease the likelihood that due process 
protections will be adopted.
Finally, in Model 3, assess claims that policy makers are more responsive to policy preferences of 
the public when ballot initiatives are allowed by further examining Hypothesis 4 and including an 
interaction term that considers the combined effect of citizen ideology (voting preferences) and the 
presence of policies in a state that allow for the public to introduce ballot initiatives. The results 
point to limited support for such claims by indicating that states with a more conservative public that 
have been authorized to advance ballot initiatives are significantly (at the p > .1 level) less likely to 
adopt policies requiring police to record interrogations.
Additional Considerations
A number of additional indicators and alternative specifications were also considered (not shown, 
but available from the authors) to see if/how they may explain the outcome or improve the overall 
predictive power of the models. These tests showed, for instance, that the inclusion of alternative 
measures of crime such as the murder rate or the overall crime rates (which includes both the violent 
and property crime rates) did not significantly influence the results (i.e., all significant variables in 
the models remained so with these alternative measures of crime). Similarly, controls for the region 
of the United States, population, the economic affluence of each state (median household income 
and unemployment rates), income inequality (GINI index), or the presence of religious fundamen­
talists did not reach the level of statistical significance in the models and did not alter the original 
findings. In addition to tests of other potentially theoretically relevant factors, additional interactions 
in the analyses were considered. First, interactions between the presence of African Americans and 
the two other direct political measures in the models were tested. Neither the interaction between the 
percentage of African American and Republican control of the state legislature nor the racial 
composition interacted with the percentage of the state voting for a Republican presidential candi­
date reached statistical significance. Overall, these results suggest that the only interactions that exist 
are those reported in the tables above and that all other explanatory variables operate best as 
independent, direct predictors of the outcome. These additional tests and specifications bolster 
confidence in the robustness of the findings.
Conclusion
Over the last several decades, there has been a growing public concern over the possibility that 
individuals could be convicted and sanctioned for crimes they did not commit (Zalman, Larson, & 
Smith, 2012) and scholarly attention has followed (c.f., Garrett, 2011; Huff et al., 1996; Martin, 
2001). This heightened concern has led to the identification of specific public policies and practices 
that appear to significantly contribute to system fallibility (Free & Ruesink, 2012) and it is clear that 
the failure to record custodial interrogations is one important factor that leads to wrongful convic­
tions because it increases the possibility of false confessions. But individual states can initiate 
statutory changes that can begin to reduce wrongful convictions and other negative outcomes
associated with the failure to record suspect and witness interrogations. Such legislative changes are 
necessary because it is increasingly clear that wrongful convictions do not simply result from chance 
error by individuals in particular courtrooms but instead reflect systemic errors (Zalman et al., 2012). 
In this study, variation in state policies that mandate the recording of custodial interrogations was 
examined to find out what social and political characteristics contribute to these vast legal differ­
ences. The analysis presented above explored sociopolitical factors across all 50 states over a 
10-year period to assess their potential influence on this type of legal change.
Prior scholarship suggests that those interested in understanding change in any criminal justice 
policy or practice may consider the broader political climate. These studies often base their 
arguments on partisan preferences for more punitive criminal justice policies (e.g., D. Jacobs & 
Carmichael, 2001; D. Jacobs & Helms, 2001). Specifically, many scholars have noted the link 
between political conservatism and punitiveness (e.g., L. D. Bobo & Johnson, 2004; Unnever & 
Cullen, 2010). This argument is relevant to law and policy that governs the police interrogation 
protocols because the popular assumption is that a requirement to record custodial interrogations 
of suspects would constrain the ability of police to garner confessions. In other words, and despite 
arguments that recording interrogations benefit all parties involved (Sullivan, 2005), a require­
ment that police record interrogations could be viewed as a benefit to the suspect and a restriction 
of police powers. Because Republican voters and politicians tend to favor policies that are tough 
on criminals (Beckett, 1997), a law that largely benefits criminal suspects would be unpopular in 
Republican leaning states. Based on this assumption and recent studies that reported fewer laws 
that favor the individual rights of criminal suspects in states with majority Republican legislatures 
(Kent & Carmichael, 2015) and more policies that limit convicted felons access to social services 
in states with Republican leaning publics (Whittle & Parker, 2014), it was expected that states with 
Republican legislatures and governors or many Republican voters would be less likely to have a 
law that requires police to record interrogations. The findings offered support for the political 
explanations advanced here.
First, results show that public partisanship matters. Findings indicate that states with strong public 
support for Republican presidential candidates were indeed less likely to require police recording of 
custodial interrogations supporting the idea that conservative citizens are less likely to favor 
strengthening the due process rights of suspects. This result aligns with the finding that states that 
allow citizens to initiate legislative change through public ballot were more likely to require record­
ing. While little evidence exists suggesting that citizens in these states actually used this direct 
legislative process to initiate these laws, this finding corroborates the possibility proposed by 
Lascher, Hagen, and Rochlin (1996) that the simple availability of this option indicates greater 
government responsiveness to public opinion about state law. Together, these findings confirm 
claims that the political preferences of the American public influence laws and policies that guide 
how the criminal justice system handles street crime and criminals. A reluctance to “police the 
police” through recording interrogations of suspects in places with many Republican voters pro­
vides evidence that the public’s preference for “tough on crime” initiatives is reflected in decisions 
about law and policy at the state level. However, the findings go beyond supporting the general 
importance of partisanship because results suggest that recording interrogations were less likely to 
be required in states with public ballot initiative rights and many Republican voters. Thus, empirical 
support is offered for prior assertions (e.g., Lascher et al., 1996), those politicians are more respon­
sive to the policy preferences of the public when public initiated ballot initiatives are allowed.
Second, results provide evidence that Republican control of the executive branches matters. 
States with Republican governors were less likely to mandate recording, but only when a sub­
stantial minority population was also present, providing additional evidence that political partisan­
ship is necessarily linked to racial composition and racial threat. States with Republican governors 
are less likely to have laws requiring recording of interrogations, but only in places with many
minorities, suggesting that state executives are sensitive to racial threat and are less likely to 
support laws that may put restrictions on law enforcement’s ability to garner confessions from 
criminal suspects. Sociologists (Pickett et al., 2012; Quillian & Pager, 2001; Taylor, 1998) claim 
that racial stereotypes about the typical street criminal and resulting fear of crime fuels some of 
these reactions. The finding that laws that mandate recording were less likely in states with high 
violent crime rates supports this assumption.
Contrary to expectations, however, states with Republican-controlled legislatures were not less 
likely to have a law that requires the recording of interrogations. This is not particularly surprising, 
however. Voting trends and the party of the governor may be better gauges of political climate than 
the party affiliations of legislatures because voter turnout is low in most elections for state repre­
sentatives, so presidential and gubernatorial election data provide a better measure of the public’s 
political preferences. Alternatively, Barrilleaux, Holbrook, and Langer (2002) propose that state 
legislators are most likely to adhere to party lines and ideologies when there is high electoral 
competition. Stucky, Heimer, and Lang (2005) applied this idea to imprisonment rates over time 
and found that partisan politics is most important during contentious elections. It is, therefore, 
possible that the party of the legislature may only have an effect on law and policy when seats are 
in jeopardy during close elections, but data to test these possibility were not available. It is clear that 
future studies should continue to monitor the influence of the general public, the party control of 
state legislatures, and the party of state executives on criminal justice policy in order to uncover the 
exact natures of these relationships.
Overall, this study clearly shows how law is structured by social context. The recent data used 
here (up to 2010) demonstrated that partisanship continues to play an important role in due process 
policy, despite arguments from some scholars who claim that criminal justice policy-making is 
becoming less partisan (Beckett & Sasson, 2004; Greenberg & West, 2001). More importantly, 
results show that partisanship is necessarily intertwined with race and ethnicity. This finding broad­
ens the scope of political and racial threat explanations. The majority of the literature has focused on 
how politics or racial/ethnic minority threat is predictive of punitive criminal justice outcomes, 
reporting an increase in coercive social control efforts that largely target street crimes committed by 
minority groups in places with more racial or ethnic minorities (Carmichael & Kent, 2014; Ruddell, 
2005) or more support for the Republican party (D. Jacobs et al., 2007). The present study looked at 
this perspective from an opposite but complementary view. Findings show that racial and ethnic 
threat is also useful in explaining a lack of support for laws and policies that favor criminal 
defendants. This fits with criminological assumptions that when crime control is the focus of the 
criminal justice system, due process becomes less important.
It is clear that recording custodial interrogations benefits all parties involved (Sullivan, 2005). 
Electronic recordings hold police accountable for their interrogation tactics and this transparency 
has the potential to increase public trust in law enforcement in a time when it is so crucial to public 
order in urban communities. Recorded interrogations aide judges and juries in making appropriate 
decisions (Kassin et al., 2010), so the benefits extend to other parts of the criminal justice process. 
Electronic recording will not eliminate false confessions, indeed, more attention should be paid to 
police interrogation tactics in general (Lassiter & Lindberg, 2010), but this measure represents one 
piece of a strategy that aims to ensure due process to criminal suspects. The present finding that 
politics, and more specifically, racial politics, influences a state’s likelihood to provide due process 
suggests that support for suspect protections is inconsistent across the United States.
While this study clearly shows how law is structured by social context, particularly the political 
and demographic makeup of the state, it does have limitations. In particular, while the focus on the 
adoption of state-level legislation related to recorded interrogations has a number of benefits, it does 
not allow us to isolate the processes that influence this practice at smaller levels of aggregation (e.g., 
the municipality). This is potentially meaningful given that a number of municipal police
departments have policies mandating the recording of interrogations in states that do not have 
legislation requiring them to do so (see the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers 
website for detailed information: www.nacdl.org/usmap/crim/30262/48121/d). Future scholarship 
should consider exploring structural conditions within cities to determine if similar conditions 
identified here are also relevant at the city level.
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Notes
1. In just one example, in October 2006, a U.S. District Court awarded Alejandro Dominguez 9 million dollars 
for a wrongful conviction for which he spent 4 years in prison and which was attributed to a false confession 
elicited by police coercion. Regardless, federal funding is available from federal and other sources to help 
offset local police costs.
2. Fifteen states have legislation requiring police officers to record interrogations. The states are Alaska, 
Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, 
New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, and Oregon. Ten of the states were controlled by Democrats 
when the legislation was passed (Democratic governor and Democratic control of the state legislative body). 
Two of the five (New Hampshire and Missouri) passed the legislation when there was a Democratic 
governor but Republican-controlled state legislature. Three states passed the legislation with while con­
trolled by Republicans (Nebraska, Alaska, and Indiana). It is noteworthy that Nebraska passed the legislation 
after six exonerations in just 2 years. Also, Alaska and Indiana are the two states that were required by state 
Supreme Court rulings to record interrogations rather than pass legislation through the state legislative body.
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